What should I assume about Section 301 tariffs when pricing a China order?

Featured answer: Assume Section 301 tariffs stay. They carry no expiry date, they have already survived a change of administration and a Supreme Court ruling that struck down a different tariff authority, and the newest layer was deliberately built on the legal footing that survived. Budget them as a permanent cost line, not a temporary surcharge.

Every buyer pricing a China order makes an assumption about tariffs, whether they say it out loud or not. The optimistic version assumes today's rates are temporary and prices accordingly. The cautious version assumes they are permanent. Since 2018 the evidence has been collecting on one side of that bet, and in 2026 it became decisive.

I price China orders for importers every week, and the question behind this article is the one I get asked most often: what should actually go into the number I send to my customer? The short answer is that the tariff is a standing cost the way rent is a standing cost. The rest of this article is the detail: what the layers actually are, why the recent court rulings did not change the answer, how to build the assumption into a quote, and what should make you re-price.

Container terminal handling China export cargo
Container terminal handling China export cargo

What the Section 301 stack looks like right now

Pricing a China order in October 2026 means pricing more than one layer. The legacy actions, running since 2018, cover thousands of product lines from China at rates from 7.5% to 100%, with strategic categories at the top of the range and most consumer goods sitting between 7.5% and 25%. On top of that sits a newer forced-labor action.

That action has a specific shape worth understanding. USTR initiated 60 investigations on March 12, 2026 into economies that had not imposed and effectively enforced a prohibition on forced-labor goods, published determinations on June 2, 2026, took public comment and held hearings in July, and issued the final action on July 23, 2026. It took effect at 12:01 a.m. eastern time on July 24, 2026. China is in the 12.5% tier. Economies that already have an enforced forced-labor import ban, or that made commitments through a reciprocal trade agreement, pay 10%.

Two details matter more than the headline rate. The first is that this layer was built to survive legal testing. It rests on Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which has a full statutory process behind it: an investigation, published findings, a comment period, and judicial review available. That is exactly the architecture the Supreme Court let stand in February. The second is that the rate has no cap and no sunset. Section 301 tariffs do not expire on a schedule the way the Section 122 surcharge did.

The practical consequence: for a typical consumer product line carrying a 25% legacy rate, the new 12.5% layer brings the trade-remedy stack to 37.5% before the ordinary customs duty is even counted. The same product cannot be reclassified to avoid the second layer by moving a step in the supply chain, because the action applies by origin economy, not by routing.

LayerRate for typical China-origin goodsLegal basisDoes it expire?
Legacy Section 301 (since 2018)7.5% to 100% by product line, most consumer goods 7.5% to 25%Trade Act of 1974, Sec. 301No expiry; modify or terminate only through statutory process
Forced-labor Section 301 (from Jul 24, 2026)12.5% (10% for economies with an enforced ban)Trade Act of 1974, Sec. 301No sunset clause in the final action
Overcapacity Section 301Determination pending as of Oct 2026Trade Act of 1974, Sec. 301Investigation ongoing
Semiconductor Section 301 (from Jun 23, 2027)Rate to be announced at least 30 days prior; stacks on the existing 50% technology-transfer rateTrade Act of 1974, Sec. 301No
IEEPA tariffsStruck down Feb 20, 2026; collection stopped Feb 24, 2026IEEPAAlready gone; refunds pending

The table's useful line is the last one. The tariff authority that disappeared in February was IEEPA, which had no statutory tariff procedure behind it. The authorities that remain, Section 301 and Section 232, both do. That distinction is the whole argument for the rest of this article.

The 30-for-30 lists change some lines, not the default

It would be dishonest to write about permanent tariff assumptions without acknowledging the one live negotiation that could cut rates for a defined set of products. In late September 2026 the United States and China published product lists under the U.S.-China Board of Trade, each side recommending roughly USD 30 billion of the other's imports for more favorable tariff treatment. On the US side the list names 77 product categories, heavily weighted toward consumer goods: toys, kitchen and tabletop items, textiles, holiday decorations, small appliances, children's car seats.

This matters, but it does not change the default assumption, for three reasons.

First, it is a recommendation, not law. Both governments stated they would implement only after completing their respective domestic legal procedures. Until an implementing notice publishes, the duty calculation does not move. Second, it covers a small slice of trade. Roughly USD 30 billion per side against hundreds of billions of dollars in bilateral goods trade means the large majority of product lines are untouched. Third, and most practically, the legacy Section 301 actions from the first Trump administration are a separate legal instrument from anything negotiated bilaterally later. No one has indicated the technology-transfer and IP actions are in scope for relief.

So the correct reading is: this is a targeted consumer-goods relief package layered on top of an architecture that otherwise stays. If your product is on the list, the sensible move is to model the MFN scenario and wait for the implementing notice. If your product is not on the list, the assumption for your next order is unchanged. The mechanism and the working procedures are covered in more detail in how the 30-for-30 tariff deal changes your landed cost.

Haven't courts struck some of this down?

Yes, and understanding exactly what survived is the most useful thing a buyer can do right now.

On February 20, 2026 the Supreme Court held 6 to 3 that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act does not authorize the president to impose tariffs. That ruling took down the reciprocal tariff programme and the fentanyl-related duties on China, Canada and Mexico. CBP stopped assessing IEEPA duties on new entries on February 24, 2026. Section 232 and Section 301 duties were not before the Court in that case and were left standing.

Then came the second event that looked like collapse. The administration turned to Section 122 of the Trade Act, the balance-of-payments authority, and imposed a 10% global surcharge effective February 24, 2026. Section 122 caps such surcharges at 150 days absent Congressional extension. The surcharge reached that limit on July 24, 2026 and was no longer collected. Court of International Trade had separately ruled it unlawful on May 7, 2026, and the government appealed to the Federal Circuit, but collection ended on the statutory clock regardless.

Here is what that sequence actually shows. Twice in five months a tariff authority disappeared. Twice, coverage appeared almost immediately. The Section 122 surcharge lapsed at 12:01 a.m. on July 24, 2026; the forced-labor Section 301 duty took effect at 12:01 a.m. on the same date in the same timezone. For a covered importer, landed cost did not fall. It changed which statute the money was collected under.

The pattern generalizes. Actions built on trade-specific statutory authorities, with findings and comment periods behind them, have a durability that actions built on emergency powers do not. That is a prediction about legal architecture, not about any particular court. The practical instruction is narrower and more reliable: price on what is being collected, not on what is being argued.

Warehouse and consolidation operations in China
Warehouse and consolidation operations in China

How to actually price with this assumption

Treat the tariff as a standing cost layer and build the model the way you build for rent or wages.

Put the full stack in the model as a line item, not a contingency. Contingency percentages get spent. A named tariff line with a rate, a basis, and an effective date gets maintained. In our team, every quote we send carries the duty layers itemized so the buyer can see which number is which, because a buyer who cannot see the layers cannot defend the price to their own customer later.

Quote with a validity window. A quote that stands for ninety days is professional. A quote that stands forever is a tariff bet you will lose. Put the date in writing.

Keep the upside asymmetric. If rates are ever cut, that is margin you discover on the next order. If you priced assuming cuts and they never came, the loss already happened. There is no symmetry here, so do not model one.

Remember the basis is transaction value, not the number on the commercial invoice. US duty is assessed on the price actually paid or payable, and that figure deliberately excludes international freight and insurance. It also adds things your invoice may not show: packing costs, selling commissions, and any assists you supplied to the factory, which includes tooling, moulds, dies and design work provided free or below cost. Buyers who take the invoice price, apply a percentage and stop there usually understate the duty, because the assist is missing from the number they started with.

What actually goes into your US customs value
US duty is assessed on transaction value, not on your landed cost. Some things get added to that number. Some do not.
ADDED TO THE DUTY BASE
  • Invoice price
    paid or payable to the seller
  • Foreign inland freight
    factory to port of loading, on non-ex-factory terms
  • Packing costs
    if you pay them
  • Selling commissions
    paid to the seller's agent
  • Assists
    tooling, moulds, dies, design work you supplied free or below cost
  • Royalties and licence fees
    required as a condition of sale
  • Resale proceeds
    that flow back to the seller
NOT ADDED
  • International freight
    ocean or air, export country to US port
  • International insurance
    incident to the international shipment
  • Post-import assembly
    or installation after arrival
  • US inland transport
    port to your warehouse
  • Duties and federal taxes
    never part of the base
  • Buying commission
    paid to your own independent sourcing agent
The asymmetry is the point. The mould you paid for is dutiable. The ocean freight you paid for is not. A buying commission to your own agent is not either, unlike a selling commission paid to the seller’s agent.
Source: 19 U.S.C. 1401a(b) and 19 C.F.R. 152.103.
Quote elementWhat a defensible quote looks likeWhat breaks
Duty layersItemized, each with rate, basis, and effective dateOne blended "tariff approx" percentage
Validity90 days from quote date, stated in writingOpen-ended validity
Duty basisStated as transaction value, with additions (packing, commissions, assists) and exclusions (international freight) notedPercentage applied to the commercial invoice price with no additions considered
Exemption statusConfirmed against the HTS code, not assumedAssuming a product category is exempt
Change clauseNamed triggers that require a re-quoteNo trigger list, so every headline forces a rebuild

What should actually trigger a re-price

Three events, each worth an hour of a finance owner's attention.

A new or modified trade action touching your product line. This is the most common trigger and the reason the current moment matters. USTR initiated a second set of Section 301 investigations on March 11, 2026 into structural excess capacity in manufacturing across 16 economies including China, covering sectors such as steel and aluminum, autos and EVs, batteries, solar panels, semiconductors, chemicals, and machinery. Hearings were held in May. At the G20 trade ministerial in Milwaukee at the end of September, USTR said results would come in the following weeks. Market expectation of roughly 7.5% on China-origin goods would stack on top of the existing 12.5% forced-labor rate. That determination is the live re-pricing event to watch, and when it publishes, it hits exactly the heavy manufacturing categories where US buyers have least pricing flexibility.

A classification change. Product or engineering modifications move your HTS code, and the code moves the rate. A housing revision, a material substitution, a changed power supply, an added sensor. None of these feel like tariff events, and all of them can be.

A supply chain change. Switching factories, altering the bill of materials, or adding a processing step can shift origin or classification. Origin decisions carry real legal weight; CBP applies a substantial transformation test, and simple assembly, repackaging, or relabeling in a third country generally does not change origin. If you are considering a China+1 move to escape a tariff, that is the question to ask first. The compliance side of that move is covered in how customs clearance and import duties work when using a sourcing agent.

Everything else is noise.

There is no need to re-price on every headline, and doing so will exhaust you, because the headlines are constant. The stack changes by decision, and decisions get published in the Federal Register.

What happens when a tariff falls

This is where the money actually is, and most buyers are not positioned to collect.

When the Supreme Court struck down the IEEPA tariffs, CBP collected approximately USD 166 billion under those authorities across more than 53 million entries from over 330,000 importers. All of it is potentially refundable. The mechanics are specific and unforgiving. CBP built a module inside ACE called CAPE, the Consolidated Administration and Processing of Entries, which went live on April 20, 2026. Phase 1 covers certain unliquidated entries and entries liquidated within 80 days of liquidation. Each CAPE declaration is a CSV of entry numbers, up to 9,999 per file, filed by the importer of record or the broker who filed the entry. Refunds go out by ACH, so bank details have to be on file in ACE first. CBP states valid refunds are generally issued within 60 to 90 days of acceptance.

Refund routeWho filesCoverage and timing
CAPE Phase 1 (in ACE)Importer of record, or the broker who filed the entryCertain unliquidated entries and entries liquidated within 80 days. CSV of up to 9,999 entries per declaration. ACH details required first. CBP states valid refunds generally issued 60 to 90 days after acceptance
CAPE Phase 2SameEntries flagged for reconciliation where the reconciliation entry is not yet on file
Protest under 19 U.S.C. 1514Importer of recordFor entries CAPE will not reach. The 180-day clock runs from each entry's liquidation date and does not pause while other litigation resolves

Two consequences follow. First, if your entries liquidated long ago, CAPE Phase 1 will not reach them and a protest under 19 U.S.C. 1514 is the remaining route, on a 180-day clock running from each liquidation date. That clock does not pause while you wait to see how other litigation resolves. Second, and this is the part buyers regret, a refund claim puts your entire entry history under a microscope. If you understated values or misclassified to soften earlier duties, the refund you are claiming is the document that exposes it.

The same clean-entry discipline that limits your penalty exposure is what makes you eligible when policy turns in your favor. Assume the tariffs stay. File like they might not.

Production floor during a factory visit
Production floor during a factory visit

What we do when a buyer asks us to price a China order

Most of what we know about this came from sitting on both sides of the quote.

When a buyer asks us to build a landed cost for a China order, we do not send back a single percentage. We itemize: the base customs value, each duty layer with its rate and effective date, whether the HTS code lands in an exemption list, and whether any assist needs to be added to the value, because moulds and tooling you paid for separately are dutiable even though they never appear on the commercial invoice. The buyer gets a number they can defend to their customer and a list of the assumptions underneath it. Buyers who want the arithmetic end to end should read how we calculate total landed cost from China to US warehouses.

One addition worth knowing in the other direction. A selling commission paid to the seller’s agent is dutiable. A buying commission paid to your own independent sourcing agent is not, because it is not one of the statutory additions. If your agent’s fee is being added to your customs value, someone is treating them as the seller’s agent.

The mistake we corrected most often in our own early years was treating duty as a negotiation variable with the factory. Suppliers will offer to absorb a tariff line in the unit price to win the order, and it sounds like a concession. It usually is not, because it comes out of the same factory price you are about to renegotiate in six months. Duty belongs in the model as a government cost, separate from anything you negotiate.

The other correction was treating every re-pricing trigger as urgent. The triggers are real, but they are published, dated, and specific to product lines. Our rule now is that a trigger gets a written response within a week, and non-triggers get filed. Buyers who ran that way stopped rebuilding their cost model every week and started actually planning around it, which was the entire point.

Conclusion

Section 301 tariffs are not a weather event you wait out. They are a structural cost of sourcing from China that has outlived an election, a Supreme Court ruling, and two complete changes in which statute the government collected under.

Price them as permanent. Itemize the layers. Quote with a window. Re-price on published decisions and on changes to your own product or supply chain, not on headlines. And keep your entries clean enough that when a layer does fall, you can collect.

Footnotes

1. USTR, Notice of Actions in Section 301 Investigations of Various Economies Related to Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on Forced Labor (final action, July 23, 2026): https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/2026/FLIP%20301%20Investigation%20Final%20Action%20FRN%207-23-26%20FINAL.pdf 2. Presidential Memorandum, Actions by the United States in the Section 301 Investigations of 60 Economies Related to Forced Labor (July 23, 2026), Federal Register: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-07-28/pdf/2026-15274.pdf 3. USTR, Notice of Determinations, 91 FR 34272 (June 5, 2026): https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-06-05/pdf/2026-11291.pdf 4. USTR, Initiation of Section 301 Investigations Related to Structural Excess Capacity, 91 FR 12886 (March 17, 2026): https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-03-17/pdf/2026-05214.pdf 5. CBP CSMS #67844987, Imposing Temporary Section 122 Duties: https://content.govdelivery.com/bulletins/gd/USDHSCBP-40b3b7b 6. CBP, International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) Duty Refunds: https://www.cbp.gov/trade/programs-administration/trade-remedies/ieepa-duty-refunds/ 7. CBP CSMS #68340863, CAPE for IEEPA Refunds Deployment (April 20, 2026): https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDHSCBP/bulletins/412cc7f 8. USTR, Notice of Action: China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Targeting of the Semiconductor Industry for Dominance (December 23, 2025): https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Issue_Areas/Enforcement/Section%20301/Semiconductor%20Section%20301%20FRN%20Final%20Action%2012-22-25%20for%20posting.pdf
9. eCFR, 19 C.F.R. 152.103, Transaction value (additions and foreign inland freight): https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-19/section-152.103
10. 19 U.S.C. 1401a(b), Value (price actually paid or payable excludes international freight and insurance): https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2023-title19/html/USCODE-2023-title19-chap4-subchapII-sec1401a.htm

Please send your inquiry here, if you need any help about China sourcing, thanks.

Hi everyone! I’m Allen Zeng, founder of GoSource — a China sourcing agent based in Shenzhen.

GoSource is a buying office, not a trading company. We work for the buyer, not the factory: a fixed service fee on top of the factory price, shown as two separate lines, with no markup on either.

Over the years we’ve run projects for 200+ overseas clients across 20+ product categories, and more than 70% of them come back for a second order.

Here I write about what actually happens when you source from China — supplier vetting, factory audits, quality control, DDP shipping, and the compliance rules that keep moving. Planning a project? Send me a message.

Please send your inquiry here, if you need any help about China sourcing, thanks.